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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases
that apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and
references are given for further research.
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I. ADMIRALTY
FORCED ENTRY OF THE SINGLE CABIN OF A

27-FOOT

SAILING SLOOP

TO CONDUCT A DOCUMENT AND SAFETY INSPECTION Is NOT AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH-United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500

(11th Cir. 1983).
After noticing that the defendants' boat was riding low in the
water, the Coast Guard boarded the boat to conduct a routine
document and safety inspection. The master of the ship refused
to produce the vessel's registration papers and to unlock the
cabin door. The officer in charge arrested the defendants, broke
the lock on the door, conducted his inspection, and found bales of
marijuana. The district court granted the defendants' motion to
suppress the evidence because it found that the document and
safety inspection was a mere pretext to conduct a search for contraband and was initiated without a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing. The court of appeals reversed the district court decision, holding that the Coast Guard may, without any suspicion of
wrongdoing, search those areas of a vessel that must be inspected
to accomplish an ordinarily competent document and safety in-
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spection. The subjective intent of the officer conducting the
search is irrelevant. Applying this principle to the instant case,
the court found that the Coast Guard had to search the cabin of
defendants' vessel to complete a routine document and safety inspection. The Coast Guard's conduct of this type of search is constitutional. Significance-This decision clarified the standards
governing Coast Guard vessel searches set forth in United States
v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980), by establishing that
document and safety inspections may be conducted without suspicion of wrongdoing and that the Coast Guard may search any
area of the ship necessary to conduct a routine document and
safety inspection.
II. ALIENS' RIGHTS
EXCLUDABLE ALIENS HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A HEARING

AFTER THE INITIAL PERIOD OF

DETENTIoN-Fernandez-Roque v.

Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
Cuban detainees who had arrived in the United States as part
of the 1980 "Freedom Flotilla" from Cuba filed a class action petition for habeas corpus relief. Although these Cubans had been
classified as excludable from the United States, the United States
Government was detaining them indefinitely because immediate
exclusion was impracticable. The district court held that although
the government was authorized by statute to detain excludable
aliens indefinitely without a hearing, this detention was impermissible under the Constitution. The court reasoned that after an
initial period of detention, the alien's basic entitlement to liberty
comes to the fore, and further detention must be justified on the
basis of a procedurally adequate finding that a detainee, if released, is likely to abscond, to pose a risk to national security, or
to pose a significant threat to persons or property within the
United States. In addition to recognizing this constitutional right
to a hearing, the court stated that the following procedural guarantees are necessary for an adequate hearing: (1) the right to
written notice of the factual allegations supporting continued detention; (2) the right to compel attendance of witnesses; (3) the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (4) the right to a
neutral decision maker; (5) the right to protection against selfincrimination; (6) the right to counsel paid for by the government; (7) the right to a presumption of innocence; and (8) if the
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hearing is to revoke the parole of an excludable alien and place
him in detention, the right to a preliminary hearing near the site
of the alleged parole violation. Significance-This decision continues the trend toward providing greater procedural and substantive rights to aliens.
EXCLUSIONARY RULE BARs USE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS OF
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY

INS

OFFICERS IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT-Lopez-Mendoza v. Immigration and Naturaliza-

tion Service, 705 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
Sandoval, a worker in a Pasco, Washington potato processing
plant was detained by Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) officers along with a group of other workers believed to be
illegal aliens. These workers were detained because they were observed "putting their heads down, turning their heads to the
sides, [and] avoiding eye contact" when the INS officers passed.
Rejecting Sandoval's contention that his detention violated his
fourth amendment rights, the immigration judge, focusing on
Sandoval's oral statement to INS officers that he was a native of
Mexico and that he had entered the United States without inspection, entered an order of deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Sandoval's appeal without addressing the
legality of his arrest. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, reversed, holding that Sandoval's detention violated the
fourth amendment, that his statements to the INS officials were a
product of that unlawful detention, and that the exclusionary rule
bars the INS from introducing in deportation proceedings evidence illegally obtained by INS agents. The court held that the
INS observation of Sandoval's behavior was "patently insufficient
as a matter of law" to provide a reasonable suspicion that Sandoval was an illegal alien and that the statements obtained during
Sandoval's detention were the fruit of an illegal search. Because
deportation proceedings are civil proceedings, the circuit court
utilized the three-part analysis set forth in United States v.
Janis,428 U.S. 433 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that
the exclusionary rule did not bar the federal government's use in
a civil tax proceeding of evidence seized by state law enforcement
officers in violation of the fourth amendment. Noting that the
prime purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future unlawful
police conduct, the court found that (1) because those who illegally obtained the evidence and those who seek to use it in a deportation proceeding are members of the same government entity,
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the deterrent effect of the exclusionary sanction is maximized; (2)
applications of the exclusionary rule outside the deportation context are not likely to deter effectively INS officers from violating
the fourth amendment; and (3) the social costs of invoking the
rule, a greater number of aliens who will escape deportation by
the suppression of illegally obtained evidence, would be relatively
low. The dissenting judges argued vigorously that the majority
opinion was a radical departure from existing law limiting the application of the exclusionary rule to criminal or "quasi-criminal"
proceedings and that the social and administrative costs of applying the rule outweigh its deterrent effect. Significance-This decision is the first to consider expressly the question of whether
the exclusionary rule applies in deportation proceedings using the
approach set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
LABOR UNION HAS STANDING TO MAINTAIN ACTION FOR VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF ALIEN UNION MEMBERS; GRANT OR DENIAL OF EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE FOR SALVADORAN NATIONALS BY IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE WAS NOT A
NONJUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTION; ALLEGATION THAT STATE
DEPARTMENT ROUTINELY RECOMMENDED DENIAL OF ASYLUM

& Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 563 F. Supp. 157
(D.D.C. 1983).
CLAIMS FILED BY SALVADORANS STATED A CLAIM-Hotel

A labor union brought an action challenging the State Department's practice of routinely recommending denial of asylum
claims filed by Salvadoran nationals and the failure of the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to
grant these nationals extended voluntary departure. Defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint. The District Court held that (1)
the union had standing to maintain action, (2) granting or denying extended voluntary departure was not a nonjusticiable political question, and (3) the plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The court's holding that the union had standing
to maintain its action was based upon a finding that the plaintiff
union had alleged injury to itself and its members' associational
ties. The Salvadoran union members, regardless of their immigration status, come within the definition of "employees" in the National Labor Relations Act, and the union is thus prohibited from
discriminating against any one group of employees. Because the
union had a legal obligation to protect its alien members, the
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court reasoned that the union had standing to bring the instant
action. The court found the plaintiff's claim justiciable because
none of the criteria of nonjusticiability set forth in Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1980) had been met. The court also cited
cases in which federal courts have authorized judicial review of
immigration decisions. Finally, the court held that plaintiffs' allegations that the State Department made its recommendations for
denial of asylum and extended departure without examining the
merits of the individual cases, stated a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The court found that this behavior violated the
fifth amendment due process rights afforded the aliens by the
United States Constitution. Significance-This decision initiates
judicial review of the Reagan administration's policy of denying
asylum to all refugees of the political strife in El Salvador and
suggests that a policy of grounding immigration decisions solely
upon national origin is unconstitutional.
III. ARBITRATION
ARBITRATION

CLAUSE THAT CONFLICTS WITH LOCAL LAW

"NULL AND VOID" UNDER THE CONVENTION

AND

ENFORCEMENT

OF

FOREIGN

Is

NOT

ON THE RECOGNITION

ARBITRAL

AwARDs-Rhone

Mediterranee Compagnia v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50 (3rd Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff, Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni E Riassicurazioni, sought subrogation in admiralty
from defendant shipowner, Lauro, for damages to insured allegedly resulting from breach of time charter agreement, unseaworthiness, and crew negligence. The District Court of the Virgin Islands granted defendant's motion for a stay pending arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration clause in the time charter agreement.
Plaintiff appealed the stay on the grounds that the arbitration
clause was "null and void" within the meaning of article II, section 3 of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards. The clause provided that the arbitration
should take place in Italy with two arbitrators, one chosen by
each party, with a provision designating a tie breaker if necessary.
Under Italian law such an arbitration agreement is null and void
because it calls for an even number of initial arbitrators. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order,
holding that, although the arbitration clause was contrary to Italian law, it was not "null and void" under the terms of the Convention. Because the goal of the Convention is to promote the
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enforceability of international arbitration agreements, the court
stated that "an agreement to arbitrate is 'null and void' only (1)
when it is subject to an internationally recognized defense such as
duress, mistake, fraud, or waiver . . . or (2) when it contravenes
fundamental policies of the forum state." Significance-In this
case the Third Circuit establishes a narrow definition of "null and
void," for Convention purposes, that will usually permit arbitration when the arbitration agreement contains only a technical violation of local law.
IV. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
TAX EXEMPTIONS IN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT ARE VOID DUE TO CONFLICT WITH PRIOR ACT OF CoNGREss-Swearingen v. United

States, 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983).
Plaintiffs, United States citizens employed in Panama by the
Panama Canal Commission during 1979, sought a refund under
28 U.S.C. for taxes erroneously assessed by the United States.
Provisions of the Executive Agreement in Implementation of Article III of the [Panama Canal] Treaty clearly purport to exempt
United States employees working in Panama from all taxes on
their Commission income. Recognizing the direct conflict between
the Agreement and section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,
the district court held that executive agreements, unlike treaties,
do not supersede prior inconsistent acts of Congress because they
require no Senate ratification and are not directly authorized by
the United States Constitution. Although the Treaty referred to
the Agreement, and both were executed at almost the same time,
the President chose not to include the taxation provisions in the
Treaty before submitting it to the Senate for ratification. The district court, therefore, refused to confer treaty status upon the executive agreement, granted summary judgment for the United
States, and declared the tax exemption void. Significance-The
decision broadly asserts that executive agreements do not share
the preeminent status of treaties with respect to prior acts of
Congress, an issue not yet decided by the United States Supreme
Court.
REPARATIONS PAID PURSUANT TO TREATY BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT FOR WARTIME INJURIES CONSTITUTE INCOME IN DETERMINING
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ELIGIBILITY

FOR

SUPPLEMENTAL

SECURITY

INCOME

BENEFITS

-Grunfeder v. Heckler, 708 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff, who was separated from her mother during World
War II, received lump sum payments and a monthly pension from
the German government for wartime injuries, pursuant to the
German Restitution Act of 1956. Characterizing the reparations
as income, the Social Security Administration determined that
the plaintiff was no longer eligible for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits which are intended to aid the needy. 42
U.S.C. section 1382a(a) (1976). Plaintiff subsequently sought judicial review of the administrative decision. Plaintiff asserted that
the reparations were not income as defined by the applicable eligibility regulations and that some of the reparations were used to
pay medical bills and thus were not income. Rejecting plaintiff's
arguments, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the administrative decision, holding that the payments were income.
The court stated that income includes earned and unearned receipts that can be used to meet basic needs, and that none of the
specific exceptions to the definition of income included the reparations. Stressing "need" as the key criterion for SSI eligibility,
the court noted that neither reparations nor tort recoveries are
excluded from the broad definition of income. Further, payments
similar to plaintiff's pension were expressly included in that definition. While SSI regulations state that certain medical payments
should not be treated as income, the court found those regulations inapplicable to unrestricted pension payments designated
for plaintiff's loss in "working capacity." The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected plaintiff's additional argument that characterizing
the payments as income violated notions of equal protection and
international comity. Significance-This case of first impression
affirms that a broad definition of income is appropriate for determining eligibility for SSI benefits intended to aid the needy.
V. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE MAY NOT CONTROL WHERE ACTIONS OF
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN AFFECT PROPERTY LOCATED WITHIN THE
UNITED STATEs-Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 570 F. Supp.

955 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Bandes, the former chief executive officer and majority shareholder of a Nicaraguan corporation (INCA), fled Nicaragua dur-
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ing the Sandinista revolution. Pursuant to several reconstruction
decrees, the new Nicaraguan Government confiscated INCA's assets and appointed a government administrator to manage and
control INCA's affairs. Bandes and the Nicaraguan administrator
for INCA were interpleaded by a United States corporation to resolve ownership of a sum of money received as payment from
INCA for an undelivered shipment of steel. In granting Bandes'
motion for summary judgment, the district court applied the corollary to the Act of State Doctrine enunciated in Republic of
Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51(2d Cir. 1965).
That corollary provides that the judiciary must give extraterritorial effect to a foreign sovereign's attempted confiscation of property located within the United States "only if [the acts of the foreign state] are consistent with the policy and laws of the United
States." It was undisputed that Bandes would have been the
principal representative of INCA, and thus the proper party to
receive the disputed funds, had the Nicaraguan Government not
intervened. The district court ruled that Nicaragua's confiscation
of INCA contravened the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution, which proscribes the uncompensated taking of
property by the state, and therefore, such an interventionist state
action was a nullity for purposes of property located within the
United States. Thus, Bandes remained the rightful representative
of INCA before the court and was entitled to the interpleader
fund. Significance-This decision reiterates judicial disdain for
attempts by foreign states to expropriate property located within
the United States without compensating the original owner as required historically by United States law and policy, and therefore
renders such attempts ineffective within the United States.
UNITED STATES COURTS WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE JURIDICAL STA-

TUS OF FOREIGN ENTITIES WHEN

To Do So

WOULD SERVE SOLELY

TO ALLOW A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TO BENEFIT FROM THE LAWS OF

THE UNITED STATES, WHILE REMAINING FREE FROM ANY COUNTER-

CLAIM-First National City Bank v. Banco ParaEl Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
First National City Bank (Citibank) issued a letter of credit
payable to Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba (Bancec),
an autonomous juridical entity set up by the Cuban Government
to serve as an official credit institution for foreign trade. After
Citibank's Cuban assets were nationalized by the Cuban Government, Citibank refused to pay money owed on the letter of credit.
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Bancec brought suit in United States District Court. Citibank
counterclaimed, asserting a right to set off the value of its assets
seized in the nationalization. While the suit was pending, the Cuban Government dissolved Bancec, split its assets among various
government agencies, and transferred them to a new juridical entity. The district court dismissed the complaint against Citibank,
rejecting Bancec's contention that Bancec's separate juridical status shielded it from liability for the acts of the government of
Cuba. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
Bancec was not an instrumentality of the Cuban Government for
purposes of the counterclaim filed by Citibank. The court reasoned that the legal autonomy of a government instrumentality
must be honored, except in situations in which the juridical entity
itself played a key role in the action giving rise to the counterclaim against the state. The Supreme Court, after initially determining that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28
U.S.C. sections 1602-1611 (1976), was not applicable to the question of Citibank's right to set off the value of its seized Cuban
assets, reversed and remanded. The Court held that principles of
equity prohibit a foreign government from bringing suit in United
States courts while remaining immune to counterclaims through
the use of juridical entities. The Court held that although the
separate juridical status accorded an instrumentality by a foreign
government is presumed valid, this presumption may be rebutted
by a showing that the foreign government conferred the status to
avoid liability for violations of international law. Juridical status
is granted to protect investors, not to shield the governments.
Significance-This decision establishes that United States courts,
applying internationally recognized equitable principles, may disregard the normally separate juridical status of a government instrumentality in order to avoid injustice.
AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT'S "BUSINESS FACILITATION"
CLAUSE THAT WAIVES IMMUNITY FROM "OTHER LIABILITY" DOES

NOT ExPLICITLY WAIVE IMMUNITY FROM PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS UNDER SECTION

1610(d)(1)

OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IM-

ACT-S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport,706
F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1983).
MUNITIES

A domestic corporation purchased goods delivered by a
Romanian trading company and paid for them by irrevocable letters of credit issued by a Romanian bank for the trading company's account. The corporation brought suit on the purchase
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agreement in the New York Supreme Court because it was dissatisfied with the quality of the goods delivered. The corporation
also demanded a prejudgment attachment of defendant bank and
defendant trading company's assets located in the United States.
The state court granted an order of attachment. After removal of
the action to federal district court, the defendants' motion to vacate attachment was granted. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that: (1) the Romanian bank and trading company were
"agencies or instrumentalities" of a foreign state under section
1603(b) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and thus
were protected by the Act; (2) Romania did not explicitly waive
its immunity from prejudgment attachment under section
1610(d)(1) of the Act; and (3) an injunction could not be issued to
enjoin negotiation or use of drafts if such relief could not be
granted by the FSIA. The waiver of immunity issue presented the
court with a question of first impression. The plaintiffs claimed
that a "business facilitation" clause of a trade agreement between
the United States and Romania that waived immunity from
"other liability" was an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachments under section 1610(d)(1) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The court disagreed, reasoning that the
phrase "other liability" does not include prejudgment attachments, which are more properly classified as provisional remedies.
Significance-This decision implies that courts will narrowly construe the "explicit waivers" requirement of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and that parties engaged in international trade
should draft "waiver of immunity" agreements that specifically
encompass section 1610(d)(1) prejudgment attachments.
A FOREIGN CORPORATION Is NOT SHIELDED FROM COMPLIANCE WITH
DISCOVERY REQUESTS, PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, BY THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF Evi-

v.
ContinentalProducts Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).

DENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS-Lasky

In a suit seeking damages for injuries sustained in an automo-

bile accident allegedly caused by defectively manufactured tires,
the defendant German manufacturer moved for a protective order
shielding it from the plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for
documents served pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a German licensed and incorporated entity, the defendant sought an order requiring the plaintiff to conduct discovery
pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
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Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, to which the United
States is a party. The district court denied the motion. The court
recognized that the Hague Convention provides discovery methods which differ from those of the Federal Rules, but stated that
the Hague Convention does not supersede the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor prevent their
use in an action against a foreign entity. The court reasoned that
a foreign entity subject to federal jurisdiction is likewise subject
to the Federal Rules. The court noted, however, that international comity considerations may require judicial restraint if the
court's order would require a party to take actions in violation of
the law of a foreign state, or which may infringe upon the sovereignty of a foreign state. The court concluded that the protective
order should not be issued because compliance with the discovery
request did not appear to require the defendant to violate German law or impinge upon the sovereignty of the Federal Republic
of Germany. Significance-This decision determines that the
Hague Convention does not supersede the discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when compliance will not
violate principles of international comity.
VI. SECURITIES
SECURITIES

FRAUD

CONSISTING

OF

SIGNIFICANT MISREPRESENTA-

TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, SOLELY BETWEEN FOREIGN PARTIES,
CONFERS

SUBJECT

MATTER

JURISDICTION

ON

UNITED

STATES

CouRTs-Gruenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983).
All parties in this case are either foreign citizens or corporations. The securities were common stock in the defendant corporation. The alleged violations of sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. sections 771 and 77q(a), and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78j(b), occurred in four separate meetings. Three of these
meetings occurred outside the United States, and the fourth
meeting, at which the agreement was executed, took place in Los
Angeles, California. The district court ruled that it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the securities
transaction did not affect United States investors or markets, and
because the only illegal act that occurred in the United States
was a repetition of a prior misrepresentation. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant's conduct
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in the United States conferred subject matter jurisdiction because
it consisted of a misrepresentation that was significant with respect to the alleged violation. The court of appeals applied Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592
F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979), which stated that United States courts
have subject matter jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud
cases, involving only foreign parties, if defendant's conduct concerned the use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce, was
not merely preparatory in nature, furthered the fraudulent
scheme, and was a significant aspect of the violation. The court of
appeals stated that a lesser standard would allow the United
States to become a base for fraudulent securities schemes among
foreign parties. Significance-This decision continues the trend
of broadening subject matter jurisdiction of the United States
courts in cases concerning transnational securities fraud and multinational parties.

